Is Baseball Shrouded in Collusion Once More?  Assessing the Likelihood that the Current State of the Free Agent Market will Lead to Antitrust Liability for Major League Baseball\u27s Owners by Mulry, Connor
  273
IS BASEBALL SHROUDED IN COLLUSION ONCE 
MORE? ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT 
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FREE AGENT 
MARKET WILL LEAD TO ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S OWNERS 
Connor Mulry* 
ABSTRACT 
This Note examines how Major League Baseball’s (MLB) current free 
agent system is restraining trade despite the existence of the league’s 
non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust. The league’s players 
have seen their percentage share of earnings decrease even as league 
revenues have reached an all-time high. This reality is due to the 
players’ inability to “cash-in” when their market value hits its apex. 
Once these players enter the open market, their value has greatly 
deteriorated and consequently, they are unable to generate earnings 
commensurate with their value to the league. 
This Note first explores the progression of MLB’s exemption from 
antitrust before briefly examining the history of the sport’s reserve 
clause. This Note then chronicles free agency’s inception, its 
subsequent development, the league’s brushes with collusion over the 
past several decades, and how the Curt Flood Act has critically peeled 
back the sport’s antitrust exemption. Finally, it demonstrates how the 
current system of free agency is restraining trade before positing that 
the pursuit of antitrust litigation is the optimal measure players can 
turn to in order to combat the current state of the free agent market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 19, 2019, Los Angeles Angels superstar center-fielder 
Mike Trout signed the most lucrative contract in sports history, 
guaranteeing him more than $430 million over a twelve-year span.1 While 
Trout is considered one of the greatest players of his generation—and to 
many, one of the greatest to ever play the sport—this is undeniably a large 
sum of money.2 The contract was an extension of his current commitment 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Anthony Wintrado, Mike Trout Signs A Record-Breaking Extension With The 
Angels, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonywitrado/ 
2019/03/19/mike-trout-signs-a-record-breaking-extension-with-the-
angels/#3ef4c031686c [https://perma.cc/DN5R-6U94]. 
 2. See generally Dale Murphy, I played against some of the all-time greats. Mike 
Trout is better than all of them, THE ATHLETIC (April 23, 2019), https://theathletic.com/ 
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with the Angels–the club Trout has played for since he was drafted into 
the league at eighteen years-old.3 With merely two years left on his 
contract, Trout was close to hitting the market where he would have had 
the opportunity to sign with the highest bidder for his services. On the 
market, he would have been one of the most sought-after commodities in 
the history of the sport.4 Instead, Trout joined the long list of established 
players in Major League Baseball (MLB) who have erred on the side of 
caution by securing their futures with their current employers.5 When 
asked why he chose to secure his future before reaching that point, Trout 
cited the slow progression of the free-agent market during the 2018–2019 
off-season as being a major reason for his decision.6 
During the 2019 off-season, Manny Machado and Bryce Harper— 
two of baseball’s biggest stars—were slated to be highly-coveted free 
agents.7 With both players entering the 2019–2020 season at only twenty-
six years-old and with multiple productive seasons under their belts,8 it 
                                                                                                                 
938406/2019/04/23/dale-murphy-i-played-against-some-of-the-all-time-greats-mike-
trout-is-better-than-all-of-them/ [https://perma.cc/V53K-7X85]. 
 3. Complete 2009 Draft Results, ESPN, http:/www.espn.com/mlb/draft2009/ 
news/story?id=4246340 [https://perma.cc/MTK8-CK7U] (last visited Aug. 11, 2019). 
 4. See Mike Axisa, MLB Hot Stoce: Why a Mike Trout free agent bidding war 
could’ve topped $600M, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 10, 2017) https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/ 
news/mlb-hot-stove-why-a-mike-trout-free-agent-bidding-war-couldve-topped-600m/ 
[https://perma.cc/8GMH-PF2D]. 
 5. See generally Gabe Lacques, Panic or pragmatism? Breaking down MLB’s $1.7 
billion flurry of contract extensions, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/columnist/gabe-lacques/2019/03/28/mlb-
contract-extensions-free-agency-salaries/3287684002 [https://perma.cc/8W5X-JXVE]. 
 6. Fabian Ardaya, Inside the conversations and texts that convinced Mike Trout to 
become an “Angel for life,” THE ATHLETIC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theathletic.com/ 
886221/2019/03/25/the-conversations-and-texts-that-convinced-mike-trout-to-become-
an-angel-for-life [https://perma.cc/58DB-DDEP] (“Trout realized even he might not be 
safe from the current state of baseball free agency and club spending on the open 
market.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Victor Mather, How Good is Manny Machado?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/sports/manny-machado-trade.html 
[https://perma.cc/DS29-AN2N] (“Make no mistake, Machado is a bona fide star. He has 
four All-Star selections in his six full seasons and has put up consistent numbers with 
only one significant stretch on the sidelines.”); see also Scott Miller, Bryce Harper 
Rejected $300M, but Is He Really a Generational Superstar Anymore? BLEACHER 
REPORT (Dec. 4, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2808604-bryce-harper-
rejected-300m-but-is-he-really-a-generational-superstar-anymore 
[https://perma.cc/NL6H-JD8N] (“There is no doubt in my mind that he is a bona fide, 
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was presumed within the industry that both players would have suitors 
lining up to pursue them.9 However, fewer teams than anticipated vied for 
their services.10 The absence of serious pursuit from multiple teams for 
two of the game’s transcendent talents has emblemized the notion that the 
current free agent system in the MLB is broken, and may lead to another 
prolonged labor dispute for the sport.11 
Machado and Harper eventually signed long-term deals,12 but other 
marquee players in the sport have not been so lucky.13 Free agents, 
including pitchers Dallas Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel, remained unsigned 
well into the 2019 season despite having tremendous track records of 
success.14 The situation these free agents have found themselves in is 
puzzling to many within the industry because while revenue for the MLB 
is at an all-time high, salaries for its players actually decreased in 2018.15 
                                                                                                                 
elite competitive advantage in today’s game.”) (quoting Minnesota Twins General 
Manager Thad Levine). 
 9. See generally Jon Tayler, A Case for Every Team to Sign Bryce Harper, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/11/13/bryce-harper-free-
agency-yankees-cubs-red-sox-dodgers-nationals [https://perma.cc/D2LU-VN8E]. 
 10. See Michael Powell, Why Isn’t Anyone Bidding for Bryce Harper and Manny 
Machado?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/ 
sports/baseball/harper-machado-baseball.html [https://perma.cc/9MEP-YLXA] (“At a 
time of the off-season when the best free agents typically would have already signed 
handsome new contracts, most club-owners have tucked away their wallets and claimed 
to need no more talent.”). 
 11. See generally Ken Rosenthal, The slow market for Harper and Machado is 
another sign that baseball’s current system is broken, THE ATHLETIC (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://theathletic.com/748860/2019/01/04/rosenthal-the-slow-market-for-harper-and-
machado-is-another-sign-that-baseballs-current-system-is-broken/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LBZ-8RSD]. 
 12. See Nick Friend, Many Machado: Record $300m deal agreed, according to 
Reports, CNN (Feb, 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/20/sport/manny-
machado-san-diego-padres-deal-spt-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/3TPD-7CRW]; 
Todd Zolecki, Harper, Phils agrees to 13-year deal, MLB.com (Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/bryce-harper-deal-with-phillies [https://perma.cc/SD4K-
C2QX]. 
 13. See generally, Powell, supra note 10. 
 14. See generally Michael Baumann, There’s No Explanation for Why Dallas 
Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel Remain Unsigned, THE RINGER (April 16, 2019), 
https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2019/4/16/18320329/dallas-keuchel-craig-kimbrel-
unsigned-red-sox-brewers-nationals-mets-cubs-phillies [https://perma.cc/7EHX-
AW2K]. 
 15. See generally Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues Of $10.3 Billion For 
2018, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown 
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This decline is likely a result of the free-agent market simply not proving 
as fruitful for players as in years past. 
This reality has led to speculation that MLB’s club-owners are 
colluding by implicitly refusing to get into bidding wars for players’ 
services.16 In theory, doing so would discourage players from pursuing 
free agency in order to retain their teams’ talent at more favorable rates.17 
Collusion—which is prohibited by federal law18—is generally defined as 
any collective action that restricts competition.19 This would not be the 
first time MLB’s club-owners have been faced with collusion charges.20 
The number of “labor-management disputes have arisen more in [the 
MLB] than in any other major professional sport played in the United 
States, particularly since the advent of collective bargaining in the past 
three decades.”21 
Professional teams in the MLB have enjoyed a special non-statutory 
labor exemption from antitrust law since 1922.22 The non-statutory labor 
exemption is permissible in United States professional sports because of 
the “peculiar nature of the labor-management relations in the industry.”23 
                                                                                                                 
/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-record-revenues-of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#340c79c35be 
[https://perma.cc/PWT9-TUDF]; see also Gabe Lacques, Panic or pragmatism? 
Breaking down MLB’s $1.7 billion flurry of contract extensions, HERALD-MAIL MEDIA 
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.heraldmailmedia.com/news/usa_today/panic-or-
pragmatism-breaking-down-mlb-s-billion-flurry-of/article_18424271-e380-56f2-8aef-
379942f5efe6.html [https://perma.cc/T8M4-WUS3] (“As their share of baseball’s 
revenue pie continues to shrink, and methods to suppress their earnings proliferate, 22 
emerging or established Major League Baseball stars waved something that looked like 
a white flag this spring.”). 
 16. See generally Jonah Kerri, Barry Bonds’ former agent says MLB owners are 
colluding against players to suppress salaries, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/barry-bonds-former-agent-says-mlb-owners-are-
colluding-against-players-to-suppress-salaries/  
[https://perma.cc/8SDP-QVJX?type=image]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012). 
 19. Darren A. Heitner & Jillian Postal, What If Kaepernick Is Correct?: A Look at 
the Collusion Criteria in Professional Sports, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 157, 158 
(2018). 
 20. See Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of 
the Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 69 (1997). 
 21. Id. at 53–54. 
 22. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 
259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
 23. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 163. 
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Sports leagues are asked to promulgate rules that will level the playing 
field among competitors—such as barring players of a certain age from 
participating in a sport, or preventing the relocation of a franchise—
frequently to the detriment of teams and individual competitors.24 But if 
any sports league is incapable of establishing such rules, their ability to 
remain competitive would be near impossible.25 Due to this reality, 
lawsuits from baseball players that claim antitrust violations are 
exceedingly rare. Instead, players have attempted to settle cases where 
club-owners have exhibited purposeful anti-competitive practices through 
grievance proceedings or private negotiations.26 
Pursuing antitrust litigation in the wake of the 2019 off-season may 
be a superior alternative to filing for grievances and/or private 
proceedings. This Note posits that contemporary free agency in baseball 
is restraining trade by preventing players from capitalizing on their 
market value at the point in their careers at which market value peaks. 
This restraint of trade has created an imbalance too great for club-owners 
to avoid under the non-statutory exemption. 
Part I of this Note explores the progression of MLB’s exemption 
from antitrust before briefly examining the history of the sport’s reserve 
clause. Part II chronicles free agency’s inception, subsequent 
development, and brushes with collusion over the past several decades. 
Finally, Part II discusses how the Curt Flood Act (CFA) has critically 
peeled back the sport’s antitrust exemption. Finally, Part III analyzes how 
free agency is restraining trade and argues that antitrust litigation is the 
optimal measure the players can turn to in order to combat the current 
state of the free-agent market. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman 
Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125 (2002). 
 25. See Grant Brisbee, Noah Syndergaard, George Springer, and Playing Around 
with Service Time, SB NATION (Mar. 21, 2014), 
https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/3/21/5531100/noah-syndergaard-george-springer-
THE-SYSTEM [https://perma.cc/V7HF-7F7B] (discussing service time and instances of 
service time manipulation as necessary evils of competitive balance). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
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I. HOW THE MLB HAS HISTORICALLY ESCAPED ANTITRUST  
LIABILITY & BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM 
The recognition of baseball as one of America’s most cherished 
cultural staples has not been lost on the American legal system. Some 
legal commentators believe that the sport’s popularity enabled it to 
originally escape antitrust liability.27 Yet, the exemption remains despite 
the weakening of its authority that came as a result of a case brought by 
outfielder Curt Flood.28 
A. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (the “Sherman Act”) is the main 
governing statute responsible for regulating the MLB’s otherwise broad 
autonomy in molding some of its anti-competitive practices.29 
Specifically, the first two provisions, often referred to as Sherman I30 and 
Sherman II,31 purport to enable unrestricted competition amongst 
businesses. 
Sherman II prohibits any sort of conduct that attempts to monopolize 
interstate commerce.32 For the purposes of this Note, Sherman II 
violations will not be discussed, as they are not relevant in situations 
involving sports leagues for reasons discussed infra Part I.C. 
Under Sherman I, it is illegal to conspire to contract in a way that 
unreasonably restrains trade in interstate commerce.33 However, not all 
contracts that restrain interstate commerce are illegal, just contracts that 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 
15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 295–96 (2005) (arguing that despite Judge Kennesaw 
Mountain Landis’s reputation as a “trust buster,” his desire to “save the sport he loved” 
prevented him from ruling that Baseball was engaged in antitrust activity in Federal 
League v. Organized Baseball). 
 28. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012). 
 30. Id. at § 1. (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 31. Id. at § 2. (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony . . . .”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 127. 
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are found to be unreasonable.34 To determine whether any particular 
restraint is unreasonable under the federal antitrust laws, a court will 
generally apply one of the following two approaches: (a) per se test or (b) 
rule of reason test.35 
Restraints analyzed under the per se rule are those that are always so 
inherently anticompetitive and damaging to the market that they do not 
require further inquiry into their effects on the market or the existence of 
an objective competitive justification.36 If it is not apparent that this 
situation exists, the rule of reason test is applied. “The focus of an inquiry 
under the [r]ule of [r]eason is whether the restraint imposed is justified by 
legitimate business purposes, and is no more restrictive than necessary.”37 
To establish a Section 1 violation of the Sherman Act, a party must prove 
two elements: (1) a conspiracy, and (2) an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.38 Sports leagues are considered to be joint ventures, which are 
entities that rely on the success of their members to profit.39 Since joint 
ventures are reliant upon the success of their members to be profitable, 
they are permitted to engage in practices—such as price fixing and wage 
restraints—that might otherwise be illegal under Sherman I.40 
B. ORIGINS OF BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM 
Baseball became a legitimate business in the United States when the 
National League was formed in 1876.41 The National League was a 
denominated major league that was eventually united through the 
National Agreement with another major league named the American 
League, that collectively formed the National Association of Professional 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 128. 
 35. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 36. See U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 37. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. 
 38. See Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 159. 
 39. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619. 
 40. See Texaco Inc. v. Dahger, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (deciding that two oil companies’ 
production and marketing joint venture, to sell separately branded gasoline to service 
station club-owners at same price, was not per se illegal horizontal price fixing 
agreement, as companies were not competing in relevant market.) 
 41. See Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act, 
Player Control, and the National Pastime, 33 GA. L. REV. 639, 644 (1999). 
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Baseball Leagues.42 The league consisted of a large number of minor 
leagues of professional baseball in addition to the major leagues, which 
attracted superior players.43 
Before the merger with the American League, however, the league’s 
preliminary club-owners reached a “secret agreement to ‘reserve’ up to 
five players per team who would become bound to their current employer 
[which persisted past the merger].”44 This agreement eventually extended 
“to include all players in their league.”45 This clause essentially enabled 
clubs to hold on to players for all ensuing seasons on a perpetual basis.46 
The economic effect of this “reserve system” was “entirely to the 
club-owners’ advantage.”47 Under this system, players were hardly 
capable of negotiating their salaries and thus benefited little from the 
game’s increasing revenues.48 Player salaries barely increased from the 
1900s through the 1960s, “even as club-owners were becoming 
increasingly wealthy.”49 
C. BASEBALL’S NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION FROM THE 
SHERMAN ACT 
Club-owners are able to manipulate the market for a player’s services 
because the MLB is virtually immune from antitrust liability. This 
immunity arose through a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
The first major case that questioned the extent to which the league 
could be held liable for antitrust violations was Federal Baseball Club of 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 
F. 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff’d sub nom. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l 
League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 2000 (1922). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Marc Edelman, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing 
Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 601, 605 (2008). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Noah J. Goodman, The Evolution and Decline of Free Agency in Major 
League Baseball: How the 2012-2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement Is Restraining 
Trade, 23 SPORTS L. J. 19, 23 (2016) (noting that the National League club-owners 
colluded to establish a reserve clause—one that gave them the ability to unilaterally 
renew a player’s contract into the next season). 
 47. See Edelman, supra note 44. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.50 The 
Federal League was a competing baseball league that at one point was 
comprised of eight independent teams.51 By 1915, however, Baltimore 
was home to the only club in the Federal League.52 The rest of the clubs 
had been bought out by either the National or American Leagues—these 
two leagues went on to become the MLB.53 
The Baltimore club, however, refused to be bought out and asserted 
that the National and American leagues were monopolizing the industry 
through their aggressive buyout strategies, and were thus violating 
antitrust laws.54 Its claims were ultimately unsuccessful, as the Court 
reasoned that the sport’s exhibitions were strictly the affairs of the state 
in which they were being played.55 This rationalization prevented the 
National and American Leagues from falling under the jurisdiction of 
federal law under Sherman I even if a restraint of trade had been found, 
and thus, resulted in the birth of baseball’s non-statutory antitrust labor 
exemption.56 
The exemption remained intact and faced little resistance for the next 
three decades. However, the MLB was eventually faced with another 
Sherman Act challenge in 1953.57 George Toolson, a minor league pitcher 
for the New York Yankees, refused to accept an assignment to the 
Yankees’ minor league team in Binghamton, New York.58 His refusal 
resulted in his placement on the ineligible list, which prohibited him from 
joining any other Major League club and effectively forced him to remain 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See Nathaniel Grow, The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L. 
REV. 859, 865 (2016) (stating that “baseball’s antitrust exemption dates back to the 
Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs”). 
 51. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200, 207 (1922). 
 52. See Grow, supra note 50. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207 (The plaintiff asserted that the 
defendants, by buying up some of the constituent clubs and inducing all of them except 
plaintiff to leave the Federal League with assistance by the Federal League president 
defendant, took part in the conspiracy.). 
 55. Id. at 208–09. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1953) 
(comparing the antitrust issues in question to those presented to the Court before in 
Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs). 
 58. See Goodman, supra note 46, at 30. 
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in the Yankees organization.59 Toolson challenged the league under the 
Sherman Act, but the Supreme Court rejected his claim.60 
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ inaction in the aftermath 
of Federal Baseball Club as demonstrating a desire to keep the MLB 
exempt from antitrust laws.61 The Court held that “stare decisis concerns 
warranted maintaining baseball’s antitrust immunity because the MLB 
had ‘been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was 
not subject to existing antitrust legislation.’”62 
Nearly two decades would pass before there was another challenge 
to the sport’s antitrust exemption. In October 1969, the St. Louis 
Cardinals traded Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies, leading to 
another attack on the exemption’s validity.63 Flood objected to the trade 
and asked to be proclaimed a free agent so that he could instead sign with 
a team of his choice.64 When the league refused, Flood filed a lawsuit 
challenging the reserve clause in his contract under the Sherman Act.65 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
reserve system’s legal invalidity stemmed from a forced restraint of trade 
through his inability to choose his place of employment.66 
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[p]rofessional 
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce,” thus 
effectively repudiating the underlying basis of the Federal Baseball Club 
decision, which held that the sport was an intra-state enterprise.67 The 
Court also admitted that baseball’s antitrust immunity was an “exception 
and an anomaly” and decided to retain the exemption.68 Consequently, the 
antitrust exemption’s legal validity remained, but cracks in its foundation, 
which had previously been perceived as impregnable, began to surface. 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id.   
 60. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
 61. Id. (explaining that the Court was hesitant to overturn its 1922 decision in light 
of the fact that “Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to 
bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Grow, supra note 50, at 868. Flood additionally claimed the reserve system 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. 
 66. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“By way of relief 
plaintiff seeks a declaration of the illegality of baseball’s reserve system, an injunction 
restraining defendants from agreeing among themselves to refuse him employment.”). 
 67. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 273. 
 68. Id. at 282. 
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II. THE BEGINNINGS OF FREE AGENCY & THE INABILITY OF PLAYERS 
TO AVOID BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
While Major League players failed to rid themselves of the reserve 
clause in the Flood litigation they were able to secure the right to free 
agency within a few years after the decision by relying on collective 
bargaining and labor arbitration.69 Securing this right was in large part due 
to the efforts of the Major League Baseball Players Association 
(MLBPA), which was becoming increasingly influential.70 By 
establishing free agency, the players fleshed out new rights for themselves 
that strengthened their position against the club-owners’ previously 
limitless autocratic system of player control.71 Despite this development 
of new rights for the players, manipulation of their services continued.72 
A. FORMATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S  
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 
The players laid the groundwork for the MLBPA’s formation in 
1954,73 before it became a “fully functioning union” in the 1960s.74 The 
players hired chief economist Marvin Miller as their executive director in 
1966.75 Miller wanted to employ the league’s grievance arbitration and 
collective bargaining “to challenge the game’s reserve system.”76 
In 1974, Miller encouraged two players—Andy Messersmith and 
Dave McNally—not to sign new contracts for the 1975 season but to 
instead make their teams exercise the “option clause” in their previous 
contracts, which required the players to play the following season under 
the previous year’s terms.77 After Messersmith and McNally played one 
year under the option clause, Miller believed the players would no longer 
be bound by the reserve system.78 Baseball’s neutral arbitrator ultimately 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Grow, supra note 50, at 869. 
 70. Edelman, supra note 44, at 605. 
 71. Id. at 608. 
 72. Id. at 608, 610. 
 73. See id. at 605. (“Originally founded in 1954 to represent the players’ pension 
interests.”) 
 74. Id. at 605. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 606. 
 77. See Susan H. Seabury, The Development and Role of Free Agency in Major 
League Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 335, 352–53 (1999). 
 78. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 607. 
2019] IS BASEBALL SHROUDED 285 
IN COLLUSION ONCE MORE? 
agreed with Miller, Messersmith, and McNally much to the chagrin of 
MLB’s club-owners.79 Previously, the club-owners assumed they could 
perpetually renew the right to maintain a player previously under contract 
by exercising the option clause at any time.80 
Unsurprisingly, the club-owners decided to challenge the decision 
which eventually made its way to the 8th Circuit.81 In Kansas City Royals 
Baseball Corp. v. MLB Player’s Ass’n,82 the club-owners were 
unsuccessful in seeking to have the arbitration panel’s decision 
overturned.83 The court held that since the club-owners and players 
collectively bargained to establish an arbitration panel, the “MLB derived 
its jurisdictional authority from the [Basic] [A]greement.”84 Therefore, 
the club-owners had approved the authority of the arbitration panel by 
supporting the establishment of the Basic Agreement and its dispute 
mechanisms.85 The decision of the Court brought forth the age of free 
agency in Major League Baseball.86 
B. FREE AGENCY & EARLY INSTANCES OF COLLUSION 
Initially, free agency was a boon for the league’s players.87 Members 
of the MLBPA were mostly satisfied with its implementation, which 
resulted in both an increase in players’ salaries and much greater freedom 
of movement.88 The Basic Agreement also included language that 
specified how players and teams could conduct themselves in free agency 
through the 1976 Basic Agreement between the MLBPA and the club-
owners.89 Namely, the 1976 Basic Agreement established the “Individual 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See id. at 606–07. 
 80. See id. at 607. 
 81. Goodman, supra note 46, at 37; Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLB 
Player’s Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 82. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 532 F.2d at 615. 
 83. See id. at 616, 629 (noting that “[t]he 1968 agreement clearly permitted the 
arbitration of grievances relating to the reserve system. It, therefore, cannot be said that 
the Club Owners never consented to the arbitration of such grievances.”). 
 84. Goodman, supra note 46, at 37. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 610 (“During the first ten years of baseball free 
agency, the average MLB player salary increased from $50,000 per year to over $370,000 
per year.”). 
 88. See id. at 608. 
 89. See id. 
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Nature of Rights.” Originally drafted as Article XVIII, Section H, the 
“Individual Nature of Rights” clause of the 1976 Basic Agreement stated:
  
The utilization or non-utilization of [free agency shall be] an 
individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and Club for 
his or its own benefit. [With regard to free agency], Players may not 
act in concert with other Players, and Clubs may not act in concert 
with other Clubs.90 
Without explicitly stating it, the “Individual Nature of Rights” clause 
foreclosed the opportunity to engage in collusive behavior.91 Despite the 
prohibition of collusion, the market for free agents inextricably dried up 
in 1985.92 Owners who were previously known to spend vast amounts of 
money to secure free agents on the open market began “praising the merits 
of ‘fiscal responsibility’” and thereby focused on retaining the players on 
their respective teams.93 
During the 1985–1986 off-season, players no longer had any 
legitimate opportunities to move to new clubs.94 Consequently, players 
remained with their current clubs on new contracts for “lesser sums and 
fewer years than desired.”95 Once the players and agents realized that the 
club-owners were likely colluding,96 the MLBPA decided to file a 
collusion grievance (“Collusion I”).97 The grievance was filed on behalf 
of the 139 players “purportedly harmed by collusion during the 1985–86 
offseason.”98 The MLBPA contended that the club-owners’ refusal to 
pursue players on opposing teams equated to a boycott in the market for 
free agents once it was undertaken by two or more teams. They argued 
that this constituted an illegal “concerted action” under Article XVIII(H) 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 191, 197 (2013) (“The individual nature of the free agency structure 
would guarantee that owners could no longer collectively agree to artificially restrict the 
baseball labor market as they had done throughout the 1900s.”). 
 92. See Stephen L. Willis, A Critical Perspective of Baseball’s Collusion Decisions, 
1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 109, 125 (1991). 
 93. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 171–72. 
 94. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 611. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 611 (“As of New Years Day 1986, not a single free agent player 
received an offer that induced his changing teams.”). 
 97. Id. at 613. 
 98. Id. 
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of the Basic Agreement,99 “so long as the teams’ actions exhibited a 
common purpose or goal.”100 
Before Collusion I was decided, the MLBPA filed a second 
grievance (“Collusion II”)101 due to the similarly slow progression of the 
free agent market ensuing off-season. Of all seventy-nine free agents 
available in the 1986–1987 off-season, the MLBPA alleged that none of 
the players received a bona fide offer from any club besides their former 
club—until at least the former team declared its lack of interest or became 
ineligible to sign the player under other free agency provisions.102 The 
MLBPA also argued that no eligible free agent had offers from two or 
more clubs at any one time.103 
Andre Dawson, a free agent all-star outfielder, emblemized how far 
the clubs had gone in refusing to work against one another in their 
respective pursuits to hold onto their talent.104 Dawson purported to have 
only received an offer from his previous club—the Montreal Expos—
throughout the off-season.105 Wanting out of Montreal, Dawson 
approached the Chicago Cubs during spring training and offered to accept 
a salary that would be unilaterally determined by the club at a later date 
without a contract.106 The Cubs signed Dawson to a contract with a base 
salary of $500,000, which represented less than half of his previous 
salary.107 Though Dawson was one of only two free agents to leave their 
respective clubs in the [1986–1987] off-season, the MLB believed their 
respective migrations were enough to offset the allegations of 
collusion.108 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Excerpts From the Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 22, 1987) 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/22/sports/baseball-excerpts-from-the-ruling.html 
[https://perma.cc/5A39-L4MX] (“The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this 
Article XVIII is an individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and each 
Club for his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players and 
Clubs shall not act in concert with other Clubs.”). 
 100. See Willis, supra note 92, at 120. 
 101. See Rodenberg & Lovich, supra note 91, at 199. 
 102. See Willis, supra note 92, at 126. 
 103. Id. at 123. 
 104. Id. at 125. 
 105. Id. at 126. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 619 (noting that the MLB clubs argued that any 
finding of collusion must be negated by the movement of free agent players Andre 
Dawson and Lance Parrish each to new teams). 
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A third grievance (“Collusion III”) was also filed by the MLBPA and 
was likewise based on allegations of collusion in the free agent market 
after the 1987 season.109 Though Collusion I was decided in favor of the 
players, the free agent market remained quiet and unfruitful for the 
players.110 Although many players received free agent offers, the offers 
remained much lower than expected.111 At the same time, the club-owners 
created an “Information Bank” that provided all teams with detailed 
information about every contract offer made to a player throughout free 
agency.112 As a result of every club obtaining intimate knowledge 
regarding the demand for a player’s services, offers were likely to be 
suppressed, as clubs had sizeable leverage in determining what the 
player’s value to the league was.113 Of the seventy-six eligible free agents, 
twelve received offers, and only three such offers led to a player switching 
teams.114 
In each respective grievance, the arbitrators ruled in favor of the 
players.115 In finding for the players in Collusion I, the arbitrator clarified 
the function of Article XVIII(H): “What is prohibited is a common 
scheme involving two or more Clubs and/or two or more players 
undertaken for the purpose of a common interest as opposed to their 
individual benefit.”116 In finding for the players in Collusion II, the 
arbitrator stated that action in the labor market was “meager,”117 and that 
the clubs’ actions constituted uniform behavior, thus continuing the 
collusive actions of the type in Collusion I.118 In finding for the players in 
Collusion III, the arbitrator ruled that although there was no boycott 
agreement in place, the collective use of the information bank was an 
anticompetitive practice that restricted the labor market.119 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See id. at 621. 
 110. See id. (specifying that even after Roberts’s stinging ruling, the free agent market 
did not return to normal). 
 111. See Marc Edelman, Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether A 
Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball’s “Collusion 
Clause”, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159, 167 (2004). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Willis, supra note 92, at 122. 
 117. See id. at 125. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 173. 
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Though the players walked away with favorable rulings,120 these 
grievances may have caused more harm than good because it resulted in 
a rift of distrust between the club-owners and players.121 This distrust 
naturally led to further accusations of collusion perpetrated by the club-
owners. 
Unsurprisingly, the continued hostilities resulted in a failure to agree 
to terms on a new CBA in 1993, following the expiration of the previously 
implemented deal.122 Subsequently, a number of unilateral changes were 
implemented by the club-owners in the Basic Agreement, and these 
changes were not received kindly by the players.123 The modifications 
included eliminating aspects of the free agency system and salary 
arbitration provisions of the since-expired CBA.124 Consequently, the 
MLBPA filed an unfair labor grievance against the club-owners after the 
players went on strike to protest the unilateral alterations to the Basic 
Agreement.125 The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
ruled in favor of the players, finding that the club-owners had 
impermissibly effectuated a change to aspects of the CBA that needed to 
be collectively bargained.126 
After an injunction was issued and the players resumed work, many 
of the issues that led to the lockout prevailed127 and the economic fallout 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See id. at 173 (noting that the three collusion cases were settled for a sum of $280 
million). 
 121. See generally Edelman, supra note 111, at 167–76. 
 122. See Alexandra Baumann, Play Ball: What Can Be Done To Prevent Strikes and 
Lockouts in Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights On, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 251, 292–93 (2012). 
 123. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 625 (“During the 1994 off-season, MLB club-
owners further distanced themselves from the players by unilaterally implementing 
various changes to the Basic Agreement . . .”). 
 124. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. 
Supp. 246, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the Board had reasonable cause to believe 
that baseball club-owners committed unfair labor practices both by eliminating free 
agency system and salary arbitration provisions of expired collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 125. See id. at 252. 
 126. See id. at 253 (explaining that a unilateral change of an expired provision on a 
mandatory topic, such as one involving wages, is an unfair labor practice, as it violates 
the duty to bargain collectively in good faith). 
 127. See Seabury, supra note 77, at 370 (“With the issuing of the injunction, the 
players went back to work, but nothing was solved.”). 
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was severe.128 Ensuing negotiations for a new CBA that followed the 
lockout led to heated debates regarding nearly every aspect of the 
agreement.129 
C. CONTEMPORARY ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION 
& THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS 
Despite prevailing contention between the club-owners and the 
players, the league found its financial footing in the years following the 
lockout.130 The free-agent market was as desirable as it had ever been for 
players131—in large part due to the sport’s increasing revenues in an era 
dominated by offensive production.132 
Despite the fiscal benefits these years brought for the league, the 
club-owners found themselves incapable of escaping allegations of 
collusion once more. During the 2002 season, rumblings of a potential 
strike began to surface yet again.133 When the 2002–2003 off-season 
arrived, those rumblings only gained momentum, as the MLBPA acquired 
information that identical bids were being submitted for certain free-agent 
players.134 
Notably, the evidence of collusive behavior in the 2002–2003 off-
season did not carry the same level of transparency as previous collusion 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Moorad, supra note 20, at 83 (“[E]stimates placed the total cost of the strike 
to both parties in the area of $1,000,000,000.”). 
 129. Edelman, supra note 46, at 625 (“The parties thereafter remained on poor terms, 
unable to compromise on even topics of great social importance such as drug testing 
procedure.”). 
 130. See Goodman, supra note 44, at 39 (After the strike the MLB was able to rebound 
quickly; league revenue increased by nearly 20 percent each year between 1996 and 
1999). 
 131. See id. at 40. 
 132. Id. at 39–40 (“Baseball’s financial growth during the late 1990s is attributed 
largely to heightened fan interest because the players’ offensive production—particularly 
batting average, home runs, and slugging percentage—increased dramatically.”). 
 133. See generally Jason Reid, Strike Date Could Be Coming, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 
2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jul-06-sp-labor06-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4VD2-SVFF]. 
 134. Edelman, supra note 44, at 625–26 (“Although the MLBPA never made any of 
its evidence publicly available, independent information compiled from newspaper 
reports seems to indicate that certain players were receiving identical bids from multiple 
teams.”). 
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cases had.135 This lack of transparency did not negate the fact that some 
questionable behavior was exhibited by the club-owners.136 A number of 
teams released high-caliber players while stressing the need to slash 
payroll.137 This sizably increased the number of players available in the 
free-agent market, which diluted the value of individual players.138 
Despite the suspect nature of league-wide behavior, the MLBPA was 
awarded $12 million once it settled the case,139 a relatively minor sum in 
comparison to the 1980s grievances, even though these players were left 
in a similar position to that of the players in the 1980s grievances.140 
Baseball’s latest collusion allegation that made its way through 
litigation stems from what is an unlikely source on the surface. Barry 
Bonds, often considered one of the greatest players in the history of the 
sport,141 found himself unable to land gainful employment following the 
2008 season.142 Bonds was still an incredibly productive player at forty-
three years of age.143 However, by the time Bonds sought a new contract, 
he found himself at the center of a performance enhancing drug (“PEDs”) 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See id. at 626 (“Although the 2002-03 off-seasons did not seem to produce any 
‘smoking gun’ invitation to collude, there were plenty of troublesome statements.”). 
 136. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 177 (referencing the questionable behaviors of 
club-owners and staff of the Atlanta Braves, Boston Red Sox, Los Angeles Dodgers, and 
New York Mets regarding the need to reduce payroll throughout the league). 
 137. See id. at 176–77. 
 138. See Murray Chass, Baseball Players See a Down Market but Smell Collusion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/sports/baseball-
baseball-players-see-a-down-market-but-smell-collusion.html [https://perma.cc/2HGC-
24P7] (“It has been that kind of winter for free agents . . . if they have secured jobs at all, 
they have taken large pay cuts of a sort not seen since the collusion era of the 1980s.”). 
 139. Edelman, supra note 44, at 626. 
 140. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 183 (“[T]he economic effect of an agreement to 
increase the number of available free agents seems similar to the effect of an agreement 
not to sign other teams’ free agents.”). 
 141. See generally Kate Lombardo, A-Rod says Barry Bonds is greatest baseball 
player of all-time, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.si.com/mlb/2015/ 
08/21/alex-rodriguez-barry-bonds-greatest-player-all-time [https://perma.cc/ZF2N-
AETL]; see also Anthony Torrente, The Dark Side of Professional Baseball: The Fall of 
Barry Bonds, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 352, 353 (2012) (“Bonds won seven Most Valuable 
Player awards and appeared in 14 All-Star games in his illustrious career.”). 
 142. Torrente, supra note 141, at 354. 
 143. Id. at 358 (noting that Bonds hit 28 home runs, had a .276 batting average, a 
slugging percentage of .565, and an on-base percentage of .480. Bonds’ statistics were 
well above the 2007 MLB batting average of .268, on-base percentage of .336, and 
slugging percentage of .422). 
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scandal and had been indicted on four counts of perjury and one count of 
obstruction of justice.144 Despite the PED allegations and the indictments, 
many believed that Bonds should have been offered an MLB club contract 
based on his tremendous on-the-field production, considering that he was 
willing to play for the league minimum salary.145 
In October 2008, the MLBPA announced it had evidence that clubs 
acted in concert against signing Bonds, and therefore, Bonds was a victim 
of the club-owners’ collusion.146 The MLBPA sought to engage in private 
negotiations rather than filing a grievance, so Bonds did not file a 
grievance until 2015.147 The arbitrator ruled against Bonds, failing to find 
a “smoking gun.”148 Bonds’ best support for his cause was his statistical 
resume.149 Though the previously successful collusion grievances in the 
1980s also exclusively relied on circumstantial evidence, Bonds was 
unsuccessful.150 His lack of further evidence made it reasonable for the 
arbitrator to conclude that each club had independently decided not to 
pursue Bonds, thereby not violating the Basic Agreement.151 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 180. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Union Finds Collusion on Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
16, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/sports/baseball/17bonds.html 
[https://perma.cc/AV2E-BSTH]. 
 147. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 181. 
 148. Id. at 182. 
 149. See Jon Heyman, MLB prevails over Barry Bonds in collusion case over his 
career ending, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-
prevails-over-barry-bonds-in-collusion-case-over-his-career-ending/ 
[https://perma.cc/YVQ4-3L6F?type=image] (noting that the basis of the case is believed 
to have gone something like this: How many folks with a 1.045 on-base plus slugging 
statistic (OPS) can’t get a job?). 
 150. Id.   
 151. See Michael McCann, Some Colin Kaepernick supporters are crying collusion, 
but what does that really mean? SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/03/24/colin-kaepernick-protest-nfl-collusion-free-agency 
[https://perma.cc/W467-FQC5] (“Therein rests a key point about collusion: There must 
be actual evidence of conspiracy. In the 1980s, some baseball owners and team executives 
took notes during meetings that later became evidence of collusion. If no such notes 
exist—emails, texts, . . . admissions of witnesses, whatever it is—there must be evidence 
that corroborates a player’s contention that he has been blackballed. A player merely 
pointing out that he has been treated worse than players of similar abilities doesn’t prove 
collusion. Teams are not obligated to sign anyone.”). 
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D. THE CURT FLOOD ACT: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE 
Congress did not address the MLB’s impermeable antitrust 
exemption until passing The Curt Flood Act in 1998.152 The CFA resulted 
from a 1996 agreement between the club-owners and the MLBPA.153 Both 
sides agreed to jointly petition Congress to repeal baseball’s antitrust 
exemption to enable Major League players to file antitrust suits against 
the league.154 
Debate persists as to whether the repeal of the exemption was meant 
to hold broader implications beyond merely enabling Major League 
players to file antitrust suits.155 What is clear, however, is that the 
exemption no longer applies to Major League players in regard to 
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements directly relating to or affecting 
their employment.156 Major League players are thus entirely capable of 
breaking the league’s shield from antitrust liability through their non-
statutory labor exemption.157 
To date, no Major League player or collection of Major League 
players has attempted to utilize this legislation to their benefit in 
combatting anticompetitive practices implemented by the league.158 Cases 
that have attempted to penetrate baseball’s antitrust exemption through 
the CFA have involved broadcasting restrictions,159 franchise 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 
747, 748 (2009) (“Congress waited nearly eight decades before finally addressing MLB’s 
longstanding antitrust exemption for the first time.”). 
 153. See Grow, supra note 50, at 872. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 894-900; see also Wyckoff v. Office of Com’r of Baseball, 138 S. Ct. 
2621, 2622 (2018) (A case brought by two MLB scouts attempting to assert that the 
league was suppressing the wages of scouts was unsuccessful). 
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2012) (“Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct, 
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major 
league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball 
players to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the 
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust 
laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate 
commerce.”). 
 157. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(c) (2012) (“Only a Major League baseball player has 
standing to sue under this section.”). 
 158. See Grow, supra note 152, at 752. 
 159. See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
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relocation,160 and minor league players,161 each one of which has been 
unsuccessful.162 Regardless, Major League players have the option to 
break through the antitrust exemption carved out for them through the 
CFA,163 provided they can demonstrate that the league is violating 
antitrust law. 
III. POTENTIAL WAYS TO SOLVE THE STAGNANT STATE OF THE FREE 
AGENT MARKET 
Even if club-owners are engaging in collusive behavior, pursuing a 
collusion grievance against the club-owners would likely be a waste of 
time. The league’s recent trend of collusion grievances—in addition to a 
lack of overtly suppressive practices by the club-owners in the 2019 off-
season—would likely work against the players in arbitration. This does 
not mean that the players are without a means of recourse, however—the 
players can break the veil of the league’s antitrust exemption through the 
Curt Flood Act. The free-agent market is currently restraining trade,164 
making this a viable alternative, while forcing club-owners to address 
some of the inequities its current construction has generated.165 
A. WHY PURSUING A COLLUSION GRIEVANCE WOULD PROBABLY BE 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
While baseball’s CBA lacks an explicit anti-collusion provision, the 
“Individual Nature of Rights” clause has set forth the basic anti-collusion 
provisions that players and clubs have been mandated to follow since 
1976.166 Article XX(E) of the 2017–2021 Basic Agreement states as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See generally City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 
686 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 161. See generally Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 162. See id.; see City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 686; see also Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d 
at 280. 
 163. See generally Grow, supra note 152. 
 164. See Goodman, supra note 46, at 44–45; see generally Brisbee, supra note 25. 
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Violate Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1367, 1382 (2016). 
 166. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 163. 
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The utilization or non-utilization of rights under [the Consent to 
Assignment and the Reserve System rules] is an individual matter to 
be determined solely by each Player and each Club for his or its own 
benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players and Clubs 
shall not act in concert with other clubs.167 
The league’s previous instances of collusion provide a framework 
for analyzing whether there is a case to be made for another in the 
aftermath of the 2018–2019 off-season.168 The MLBPA could and should 
then consider as precedent the rulings in Collusion I, II, and III,169 as well 
as the relatively unsuccessful grievances since then.170 Looking at 
Collusion Grievances I, II, and III, the primary issue for a prospective 
arbiter to consider is whether any agreement existed between the clubs to 
avoid—or at least prolong—pursuing free agents in the 2002–2003 off-
season long enough to drive their asking prices down.171 
While the arbiters determined that implicit agreements amongst the 
club-owners could be enough to constitute collusion under the Basic 
Agreement in the first two collusion grievances,172 the realities of some 
of the disincentives for pursuing free agents who are past their prime,173 
would make the finding of such an implicit agreement highly unlikely. 
During the off-seasons following the 1986 and 1987 seasons, free agents 
did not leave their previous employers and the free agent market was 
virtually non-existent, which is not the case for the majority of free agents 
in 2019.174 
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Therefore, the 2019 off-season more closely resembles the 2002–
2003 off-season than the 1980s off-seasons. The dilution of the market 
with free agents over the age of thirty and the recognition that these free 
agents are less valuable has often forced free agents to sign less-than-ideal 
contracts, but no other circumstantial evidence would suggest there is a 
“smoking gun” showing collusive actions by the club-owners.175 
Likewise, the rationale used for Barry Bonds’ case translates here as well: 
clubs are not obligated to sign particular players. 
Jeff Borris, a thirty-one year-old player agent for the MLBPA—who 
adamantly believes club-owners are colluding—correctly observed: 
[T]here is no smoking gun, no directive from Commissioner Manfred 
instructing clubs to limit their competition for free agents or to delay 
signings until late in the off-season when players panic creating a 
buyer’s market. One hundred years of trial and error has taught the 
club-owners how to avoid getting caught.176 
B. THE CURRENT CBA & HOW FREE AGENCY IS CURRENTLY 
RESTRICTING TRADE 
The current CBA binds players to their clubs for six seasons before 
they can become eligible for free agency.177 Eligibility for free agency is 
based on service time that is acquired only when playing at the Major 
League level.178 If a player is promoted to an MLB club and remains on 
its active roster for the entire season, he will have one full year of credited 
service at the conclusion of that season.179 
During a player’s first three seasons, he is paid the league’s 
minimum salary.180 Once a player has been on a roster for three successive 
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seasons, he becomes eligible for salary arbitration.181 During arbitration, 
both the club and player each present a dollar figure to an independent 
arbiter, who then decides for the player or the club based on comparable 
players’ salaries.182 
After three years of arbitration, any player with six or more years of 
service time who has not executed a contract for the following season can 
become a free agent.183 However, before a player can become a free agent, 
his former club has the ability to extend a qualifying offer.184 A qualifying 
offer is “a one-year Uniform Player’s Contract for the next succeeding 
season with a guaranteed salary that is equal to the average salary of the 
highest-paid players each year.”185 If the player accepts the qualifying 
offer, he is signed for the next season.186 However, if the player rejects his 
former club’s qualifying offer and elects to become a free agent, his 
former club is compensated with a draft pick in Baseball’s amateur 
draft.187 
Free agency, as currently constructed, is restraining trade in myriad 
ways. Because players earn significantly larger sums once they are 
eligible for arbitration, club-owners and general managers are 
incentivized to prevent players from becoming eligible for as long as 
possible.188 Consequently, players are often held in the minor leagues in 
order to prevent their service time clock from starting, so that they will 
only play in the Major League when they can provide what is perceived 
to be optimal production during their “prime years.”189 
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Kris Bryant, of the Chicago Cubs, is the perfect example of a victim 
of service time manipulation. Bryant, the second overall pick in the 2013 
MLB draft, put up phenomenal statistics while in the Cubs’ minor league 
system during the limited time he was there.190 Despite his success, he 
was left off the Major League roster to start the 2015 season.191 A decision 
that surprised few—if any—in the industry was Bryant being left off the 
Major League roster initially, yet he was “called up” to that roster within 
two weeks after the start of the 2015 season.192 The Cubs’ reasons for 
doing so were strictly financial, as keeping Bryant in the minor leagues 
for those two weeks gave the team an extra year of control, thus delaying 
Bryant’s free agency and eligibility to arbitrate for another year.193 
Manipulation of service time directly ties into the second principal 
issue with free agency: players are placed on the open market past their 
window of greatest production.194 Players’ performance peaks as they 
reach their late twenties.195 Both physical ability and performance decline 
when the average player crosses the thirty-year-threshold.196 The average 
age for first year players (“rookies”) breaking into the Major League in 
2005–2009 was 24.4 for position players and 25.3 for pitchers,197 meaning 
that most players which make it to free agency do so on the wrong side of 
thirty. 
Looking at the production value for players through the game’s most 
popular metric, Wins Above Replacement (“WAR”),198 the 2017–2018 
off-season average age of thirty-two has significantly decreased the 
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production value brought to the league.199 Consequently, teams have 
recognized that there is a disincentive in allocating their resources on free 
agents past their prime years of production.200 Instead, teams are choosing 
to invest their resources (1) through the MLB amateur draft, (2) on 
international free agents, and (3) by signing their young players to long-
term contract extensions through their prime years.201 
Additionally, free agency has restricted players’ employment 
opportunities through its implementation of the Qualifying Offer. When 
a player rejects a Qualifying Offer, clubs are forced to choose between 
signing that free agent and forfeiting at least one valuable draft pick.202 
The cases of former free agent pitchers Dallas Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel 
emblemize the negative repercussions of extending a pending free agent 
the Qualifying Offer. Both players began the 2019 season without a 
contract and subsequently did not receive one until June, two months into 
the season, largely so that their new clubs would not forfeit draft pick 
compensation once they were signed.203 
While the CFA unquestionably gives Major League players the right 
to pursue antitrust litigation against the league, the restraint imposed by 
the league should be considered unreasonable under the Sherman Act. By 
definition, collusion under Baseball’s CBA is not quite identical to 
collusion under U.S. antitrust laws.204 However, cases asserting collusion 
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in baseball are often successful on grounds that are substantially similar 
to cases dealing with collusion in non-baseball antitrust cases.205 
Since free agency has been collectively bargained for by the MLBPA 
and the club-owners, it is unlikely that the players could utilize the per se 
test in demonstrating how free agency is currently restraining trade.206 
Likewise, since the league is a joint venture—the per se rule would not 
likely be permissible.207 Therefore, the rule of reason test would apply in 
such litigation. 
The rule of reason analysis attempts to determine whether the 
restraint imposed (1) is justified by legitimate business purposes, and (2) 
is no more restrictive than necessary.208 The inquiry is confined to a 
consideration of the impact on competitive conditions in the 
marketplace.209 The rule of reason thus requires the factfinder to decide 
whether under all the circumstances the agreement imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.210 
The anti-competitive aspects of service time manipulation that 
disables players from reaching free agency until they are in their thirties 
is undeniable and has led to the stagnant state of free agency today. 
However, the utilization of such restrictive measures is also a fundamental 
aspect of professional sports leagues.211 By the same token, there are 
alternative measures to the way the free-agent market is currently 
constructed that would be less restrictive on players’ ability to capitalize 
when their market value is at its peak. 
One way this can be accomplished is by implementing a restricted 
free agency—a hotly debated topic of discussion when the club-owners 
unilaterally implemented it the 1994 season.212 As proposed then, 
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restricted free agency would be implemented after a player serves four 
years in the league. Thereafter, he would become a restricted free agent, 
meaning that though other clubs could offer him a contract, his current 
club can retain his rights by matching the highest offer on the market.213 
Restricted free agency could create a gateway to accumulating greater 
returns for players by entering the open market earlier, while providing 
club-owners with the option of holding on to those players. 
Another less restrictive alternative would be to enable players to 
reach free agency after four years of Major League service.214 This 
method would curb the number of free agents who find themselves past 
the age of thirty years-old on the market, and would force front offices to 
be more competitive by bidding on players with larger windows of 
production ahead of them. 
CONCLUSION 
The MLB has been an intricate aspect of American culture since the 
late nineteenth century. Neither the players nor club-owners want to see 
a work stoppage. If one occurs, the consequences could be fiscally 
catastrophic. Therefore, any means necessary to prevent such a stoppage 
need to be considered. 
Only a handful of players are able to remain productive at such ages 
in a league buoyed by great young talent. Club-owners’ continued 
manipulation of player service time is restraining trade and inherently 
violates antitrust laws. In order to receive just compensation, the players 
and the MLBPA should pursue alternatives such as reducing player 
service time required for free agency or establishing restricted free 
agency. The tangible threat of antitrust litigation should be enough to 
bring both the club-owners and the players to the bargaining table, and 
therefore, facilitate an agreement that will leave both sides, as well as 
millions of fans, satisfied. 
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